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CAUSES AND TRENDS OF STRIKE ACTION 
IN EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES 
THEODOROS KA TSANEV AS 
INTRODUCTION 
In the daily reality of modern polycentric societies, strike action expresses 
the divergence of contrasting interest and expectations. It is "the morning lunch 
of Parliamentary Democracy" 1 which the mass media frequently endeavours 
to make it look or sound frightening, especially if there are some violent and 
blood clashes related to the dispute. Tpe strike, however, is considered to be 
the most important source of organized labour in its struggle to win concessions. 
It is "a planned withholding of labour designed to impose union demands on 
the employer from the employee or to prevent the employer from imposing 
his demands on the union".2 Although, there are multiple economic, social, 
legal and political interpretations, strike action has been defined as "a temporary 
stoppage of work by a group of employees in order to express a grievance or 
enforce a demand". 3 
An attempt has been made in this paper to determine the dominant 
influences of unemployment upon industrial disputes, as well as to trace the 
causes and trends of strikes in Europen Union countries in recent years. The 
main source of data is from the LLD's "Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1994". 
The original source of this same data is mainly drawn by the LL.O. from 
goverment statistical services of the countries included in the study. For reasons 
of statistical comparability, the use of sources other than the LLD. (except in 
certain cases) has been avoided. 
The estimates were also checked and compared with Eurostat statistics 
and publications especially, "The Rapid Reports", "Populations and Social 
Conditions", and "Trends in Industrial Disputes in the European Economic 
Area, 1983-1992. "There exist certain differences in statistical data between the 
two main sources, that is the "Yearbook of Labour Statistics of the ILO" and 
the "Eurosat of the EC", although the general trends and findings are rather 
similar. 
For Belgium and the Netherlands, the time series are incomplete, while 
for Luxemburg they are not available. The data used for Greece draws on 
publications by "The General Confederation of Labour of Greece", which takes 
its information from data reported by "The Greek National Statistical Service". 
Although the Confederation may have over-estimated some of its strike data, 
its chronological series and sectoral analysis are usually daily complete, and 
known to be satisfactory. 
It should also be noted that an attempt had been made to extend the 
conclusions from data based on a fairly long period of time, that is between 
1973 and 1993. However there were many statistical differences and gaps in 
information which made the conclusions for that period questionable. 
Nevertheless, even when taking the deferent data into consideration it still 
appears that their is a negative correlation between unemployment and strike 
trends for the extended period 1973-1993. In this sense, there is a general 
lowering of strike activity which could be attributed, to a certain extent to the 
persistent increase of unemployment. 
The extensive and methodological elaboration of statistical data was made 
with the co-operation of economist Stefanos Karakitsos, while the data was 
collected by economics graduate Georgia Tsetsou. Many thanks are due to 
Professor Chris Jecchinis for his important observations and contributions to 
this study. 
A SURVEY OF PUBLISHED RESEARCH STUDIES ON STRIKE CAUSES AND 
TRENDS 
The propensity to strike has been made the object of numerous research 
papers which have appeared in several international studies. There seems to 
be many aspects of the problem. In an old empirical research study of "strikes 
in 15 countries between 1890 and 1956", Ross and Hatman have pointed out 
a series of factors which cause their development, such as: 
1. the organized stability and age of the labour movement; 
2. leadership conflicts; 
3. status of union-management relationship; 
4. labour activity; and 
5. role of the State. 
In another well-known comparative study covering various countries, Clark 
Kerr and Abraham Siegel came to the conclusion that the factors which have 
a definite influence on strike behaviour are , the geographical and social isolation 
of a working class community, the limited occupational differentation among 
variables, and the coherence of the group. 5 After taking into consideration those 
variables, Kerr and Siegel add that there is also a high propensity to strike 
among workers in certain sectors of economic activity, such as mining, ports, 
and ironimetal industries. Furthermore, according to the same scholars other 
interrelated factors, should be considered such as the size of business, the 
structure of production, the degree of technological change, the type of work 
organization applied, as well as the costs of production and the existing market 
commodities. 
Smith et al in a sectoral analysis of stikes in Great Britain for the period 
1966-1973 concluded that, "higher than average strike activity appears to be 
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associated with high earnings in the industry, labour costs representing a high 
proportion of total costs, a high proposition of large establishments in the 
industry and a low proportion of female employees". 6 
The Donovan Commission in Great Britain, attributed the increase of strikes 
during the decade of 1960 to the increase of trade union organizations' power 
and to the decentralization of collective bargaining. 7 Turner and Roberts, 
conluded that, "the normalization of company bargaining procedures and of 
stop stewards status to be a factor encouraging labour conflict". 8 And according 
to Hue Clegg, " the pattern of strikes is therefore closely associated with the 
structure of bargaining in each country". 9 
Unquestionably, in addition to the above findings of prominent scholars, 
there are other factors which affect strike tendencies such as the political climate, 
the prevailing ideological trends, the values and behaviour of society as a whole 
vis-a-vis union militant demonstrations, 10 and in recent years, the impact of 
mass media. 
In an effort to explain the reduction in strikes recorded in most European 
countries, during the 1980's, Antony Ferner and Richard Hayman pointed out 
that the following factors may be responsible for declining strike activity: 
1. the creation of new institutions of dispute resolution; 
2. the finest tuning of old mechanisms; 
3. the crystallization of new structure of workplace representation; 
4. trends towards small work units; and, 
s. the shift from manufacturing to services, and from manual to white collar 
(and the associated feminization of the workforce).l1 
John Hicks in an estabished, well thought of analysis, which is commonly 
known as "the accident theory of strikes", concludes that "strikes result from 
faulty negotiations" and there are variables which increase the uncertainty of 
the two parties to a negotiation. 12 An alternative view is found in Arthur Ross's 
political theory of strikes, which is based on the assumption of descripancies 
in information or different aims between union leaders and the rank-and-file. 13 
There is also material to support the theory that the time of conducting 
parliamentary elections is a period which influences strike tendencies. This 
is because trade unions can exploit the pre-election time and press for wage 
increases when governments are particularly susceptible to concessions. Paldam 
and Pedersen support the disputable assertion that strike tendencies are stronger 
under a left-wing government than under a right-wing one. 14 They state that, 
"either that left-wing governments are more likely to enact conflict-reducing 
reforms (the reduction could be through appeasement or control) or that workers 
feel more solidarity with left-wing governments which reduces conflict. The 
main reason to expect a negative co-effficient is that workers are likely to have 
higher wage expectations under left-wing than under right-wing. In the opinion 
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of the author, Paid am and Pedersen conclusions are questionable at least for 
the countries with strong political parties/trade unions relationships, such as 
Greece, and where leading trade union officials have close relationships, with 
socialist olitical parties and governments. These situations often have a sobering 
effect on the decision to strike. 
On the same issue Jack Skeels claims that, there is a positive relationship 
between strike frequency and having a Democratic President in the white 
House. 16 While Davies has concluded, (as it seems to be more logical) that, 
British strike frequency is significantly related to incomes policy and a tax-
pressure variable, 17 wage-price controls appear to have reduced, at least for 
a certain period of the time, the propensity to stike. Once, however, these 
controls are lifted, conflict activity usually rebounds as unions seek to make 
up for lost gains. 18 
An increasing rise of profits on the one hand, and inflation uncertainly on 
the other, normally induces a higher level of strike activity, 19 because it forces 
the hand of trade union leaders for action. 
Reviewing quarterly data for U.S. manufacturing over the period 1954-1974 
Bruce Kaufman reported a significant positive relationship between work 
stoppages and inflation. 20 Before that, as early as 1952, Knowles presented 
graphs also showing a positive correlation between the number of stikes and 
the level of prices and wages in Britain, and a slightly less impressive negative 
relationship between strikes and the unemployment rate. 21 
Substantial rises in corporate profits may cause a rise in strike activity if 
corresponding expectations for higher wages are not met. A different view has 
been expressed by Paldam and Pedersen who seem to have reached a more 
acceptable conclusion. They maintain that "changes in the wage structure is 
a dominating force behined change in conflict intensities. Conflicts may thus 
be generated by tensions between individuals' actual positions in the wage 
structure and their desired position-as formed by tradition, conceptions of justice 
and reason so forth". 22 The same authors in their study of seventeen countries, 
have in fact found only a rather weak correlation between unemployment 
inflation rate and strike activity. 
Legal regulations which are considered supportive to trade unions, such 
as the Wagner Act of 1935 in the United States, may also lead to more industrial 
disputes as unions want to exercise their new found organizing and bargaining 
rights. 23 On the other hand, hostile government intervention such as that of 
President Reagen's decision to fire the air traffic controllers during their wild-
cat strike of 1981 had the opposite effect. As Bruce Kaufman stresses, that kind 
of action appeared to have had a chilling effect on the willingness of other unions 
to strike, since both labour and management interpreted the Reagen 
intervention as a signal that, from then on, it was permissible for strike breakers 
to replace workers who went on strike. 24 Strong arm government tactics 
against unions however, may have in some cases the opposite results, depending 
upon the prevailing political climate and the position of the mass media.25 
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Peter Cramp ton and Joseph Tracy in a recent study supported a model in 
which industrial dispute activity is driven by the level of uncertainly over the 
value added by organized labour under a new contract, and that the shape of 
disputes will shift toward strikes when the real wage falls during the prior 
contract and when labour market conditions are tight. 26 
STRIKES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
Several studies have shown that the single most important influence on 
activity appears to be the expansion and contraction' of economic activity within 
the business cycle, 27 The typical pattern of strike activity logically should follow 
the cycle, increasing after the upswing of the business cycle and falling off after 
the downswing, Inflation uncertainty and new inflation projections often 
correspond with a higher level of strike activity,28 Hansen in his 1921 analysis 
of strike data from 1881 to 1919 concluded that, "strikes correlate inversely 
with the business cycle in periods of long run rising prices".29 Griffen 
examining strike data between 1881 and 1937 came to the same conclusion in 
1940 and stated that increases in business activity were associated with increases 
in strikes and vice versa. The same author stated that "strikes have continued 
to oscillate in accordance with two factors. The first is the business cycle which, 
whether measured by prices or wages, has had a corresponding correlation to 
strikes. The second is the political climate". 30 
Griffin, like Yoder in 1938,31 Burns and Mitchell in 1946,32 JurKat and 
JurKat 1949,33 Rees in 1952,34 O'Brien in 1965,3SWeintraub in 196636 and Bain 
in 197637 found a certain positive correlation between the business activity and 
strike action and/or unionization growth. 
Kennan, more recently, after summarizing such earlier studies concludes 
that, "there is persuasive although not conclusive evidence that the frequency 
and (more importantly and more doubtfully) the incidence of strikes are 
positively related to general cyclical movements in the economy. There is also 
more recent evidence that stike duration is negatively related to the cycle". 38 
UNEMPLOYMENT VERSUS STRIKES 
Particularly connected with the business cycle and the inflation rate, is the 
level of employment and unemployment. Empiral evidence are here worked 
on has shown that the cyclical trend of the unemployment rate of the European 
Union countries was found to be a serious factor influencing strike activity. 
Albert Rees in a comprehensive paper written in 1952, asserts that, "strikes 
occur during periods of rising employment to secure wage increases and other 
benefits in unionized plants and also to organize the unorganized. Rising 
employment and improving business conditions offer the unions a variety of 
stategic advantages: the employer's reluctance to lose his share of the expanding 
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market, and his observation of rising wages elsewhere lower his resistance to 
union demands. During periods of business and employment expansion, 
employers are softer to union demands because they are afrmd to lose I:be;r 
share of expanding market". 39 
On the other hand, as Rees indicates, strikes drop sharply during periods 
of falling business activity and rising unemployment. Employees not covered 
by unions are unwilling to unionize for fear of being easily dismissed. Unionized 
employees also see their bargaining power diminish, while employers' power 
is stregthened due to their ability to fill orders out of inventory or make up 
for lost production after the strike is over. 
In periods of falling employment, Albert Rees stresses "the union may fear 
that a strike or a granting of economic conscession by the employer would 
damage his competitive position and thus imperil the jobs of some union 
members. This will be especially true where the employer faces competition 
from non-unionized employers. Moreover, workers who keep full-time jobs 
during the early stages of a depression usually get real wage increases without 
striking. These are produced, on the one hand, by the general tendency of wages 
to be striking downward, reinforced by fixed-term union contacts, and, on the 
other hand, by the fall in consumer prices. As the downswing progresses a rising 
proportion of the diminishing number of strikes represents protests against wage 
reductions made or proposed by employers". 
In the civil service and the broader public sector, although unemployment 
does not threaten job security directly, the general climate of depression that 
prevails under the downtrend of the economy, is more likely to influence 
negatively trade union decision-making vis-a-vis strike initiatives. Therefore, 
unemployment appears to have a chilling effect on strike action not only in 
the private but also in the public sector. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the above trends, there may be some positive 
influence of unemployment upon short-term strike action. This influence is 
linked to technological changes. This is so, especially in the present times of 
technological revolution, when whole industrial sectors and occupations have 
diminished, while others connected with high technology and services are 
growing. These changes have important repercussions upon activities. When 
the closing down of factories is followed by massive dismissals, they lead to 
intense strike action often with violent repercussions. 4o In this case therfore, 
unemployment has had the opposite effect, though short-term since it results 
in strike outbreaks. 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND STRIKE TRENDS BETWEEN 1983 AND 1993 IN THE 
EUORPEAN UNION COUNTRIES 
According to the empirical findings based on statistical data shown in 
diagram I, between 1983 and 1993 in the eleven European Union countries 
researched,41 unemployment has generaly had a negative influence upon strike 
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activity. This correlation, at least for the periods where relatively trustworthy 
statistical data exist, is stronger for countries such as Greece, Ireland, Denmark, 
Netherlands and Italy. In other countries notably Germany, France, Portugal 
and United Kingdom, the same correlation is rather loose, while in Spain and 
Belgium it is almost non-existent (see diagram 2). 
A rise in strike activity (which is measured against the most comprehensive 
and representative indexes of the yearly average days lost due to strike action 
per 1000 employees), should logically follow the fall of unemployment. 
Nevertheless, according to the data shown in diagram 1 and 2, this is normally 
the case. 
The diagrams and the table included here are derived primarily from 
statistical data of "The ILO Yearbook of labour Statistics"for the reasons given 
in the Appendix. In order to study the correlation between unemployment and 
strike trends, the. data of the eleven European Union countries have been 
examined because, in their case, there is trustworthy and comparable yearly 
data of unemployment statistics for years researched. For furthur analysis of 
statistical trends and patterns in strike activity, three more countries have been 
added which were more recently included in the European Union That is: 
Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
A special analytical methodology was employed for the available data in 
order to present the diagrams and the table included in this paper. The 
methodology is included in the Appendix at the end of the article, and given 
in a brief form because of the limited space of this paper. 
For some countries, such as Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Ireland, there 
is incomplete time series data. In the case of Greece the strike data provided 
by the "Greek General Confederation of Labour" has been used for reasons 
which are explained in the Appendix. 
Unquestionably, statistical data has comparative and definitional 
problems.42 In some countries for instance, unofficial, unconstitutional or 
wildcat strikes are not registered, or there is a level under which low number 
of strikes are not computed.43 In other cases, employees who lose working days 
from strikes without their consent, or those who went on strike in order to 
support their striking colleagues, are included in the total number of strike data. 
In some countries, such as Greece, political pressure has obliged the National 
Statistical Service to reduce the statistics for strikes as they had done 
occasionally in the case of unemployment and inflation indices. 
Strike statistics, Hyman notes, "are an imperfect measure of work 
stoppages; and that work stoppages themselves are only a partial indication 
of industrial conflict, let alone the general climate of industrial relations in a 
nation or an industry"44 As it is said there are "lies, damned lies and strike 
statistics".4s Hugh Clegg, prominent professor of industrial relations, concluded 
that, "although comparisons of the number of strikes between industries and 
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between countries must be treated with some reserve, comparisons of the 
number of working days lost present a more accurate picture"46 Bearing in 
mind the above remarks, the statistics are used here in an attempt to describe 
and explain general strike trends. No one, however can claim that statistics 
is a substitute for critical insight and substantive knowledge. Yet, when all is 
said and done, statistics remain a powerful instrument for describing, explaining 
and evaluating social phenomena. 
OTHER NON-ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
The different pattern that appears in the correlation between 
unemployment and strike trends among countries as shown in diagram 2, should 
be attributed to other variables which apply for the present period of time and 
for comparable systems, such as those of the European Union member-states. 
After reviewing the findings and hypothesis of several other earlier studies 
already mentioned and considering the present industrial relations trends in 
Europe, it has been suggested that, the non-economic variables which influence 
strike propensity, (in addition to the important unemployment fact), appear to 
be mainly the following: 
1. The year of election; 
2. Income and tax policies; 
3. Inflation projections, profit rises and wage structural changes; 
4. Unionization density and strength; 
5. Degree of centralization of collective bargaining structures and procedures; 
and 
6. Political climate, traditions and government policies. 
In an election year unions are usually more provocative in their demands 
and hence ther is a higher prosperity for strike occurrence in certain cases, 
however, weak governments headed by ambitious politicians, may be eager 
enough to accept union demands and thus,strikes may be either of short duration 
and/or remain at the threatening stage. 
Strict incomes and tax policies are also likely to encourage strike activity. 
The same is true in the case of high inflation projections and of profit rises, 
as well as when the wage structure under goes only normal wage increases. 
Unions with high levels of density and strength, and/or unions in the broader 
public sector of the economy, are more prone to go on strike, and pay less 
attention to the unemployment stituation. 
However as most writers agree, in cases of centralized collective bargaining 
structures and procedures, there is a lower tendency to strike. Finally, in some 
countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the political climate and 
traditions encourage strike protest action usually of short duration, in contrast 
to central-north European countries such as Germany, Sweden, Austria and 
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and United Kingdom. Under political climate one should also include 
governmant policies towards unions which, in general, also influence strike 
attitudes. 
For the testing of the above hypothesis on the influence of the non-economic 
variables mentioned above, in addition to the important unemployment factor, 
the reserach work for this paper concentrated on the case of Grece for which 
there is available considerable first hand information. Thus diagram 3 shows 
the obvious strong correlation between unemployment and the propsensity to 
strike in this country. Results show that at least for the period 1983-1993, when 
unemployment rose in Greece, strike activity fell and vice-versa. 
Furthermore, when the non-economic variables are considered, it shows 
that strike activity fell after the 1981 and 1990 elections, but that it rose sharply 
before and during the 1989-1990 three successive elections, in which time the 
political climate and the weak coalition government of that period was 
particularly vulnerable to strike threats and action. Industrial dispute activity 
also increased sharply during the periods of strike incomes policy between 1985 
and 1987. 
The political climate, traditions, government policies, inflation, profit rising 
projections and wage structural changes, appear also to be relatively positive 
factors for the escalation of stikes between 1989 and 1990. The opposite has 
been the case with their downward trend after that period. 
The above non-economic variables, thus appear to have influenced industrial 
conflict in Greece in addition to the dominant unemployment factor. As a result 
the negative correlation between unemployment and strike trends appears to 
be particularly strong in this country's case. 
Unionization density and strength in Greece, is characterized by the fact 
that it is low in most parts of private industry and relatively high in the public 
sector (civil service, public utilities, public transport and public banks). Collective 
bargaining procedures in the country's case are controversial, depending largely 
upon the state authorities. 47 These variables appear not to have influenced 
strike trends to the extend that they may do so, as other countries in other 
studies previously mentioned have shown. 
STATISTICAL FINDINGS AND COMPARISONS 
According to Table A (and diagram 4) presented in this paper, high strike 
prone European countries (measured by the yearly average days lost due to 
strike activity per 1.000 employees), for the period 1983 to 1993 are the following: 
1. Spain (413 days lost per year) 4. Italy (217) 
2. Greece (295) 5. Ireland (208) 
3. Finland (272) 
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Medium . strike prone countires which are closer to European yearly 
average of 133,6 days lost per 1000 employees, include: 
6. United Kingdom (198) 8. Sweden (80) 
7. Denmark (121) 9.Portugal (47) 
Low prone strike countries are: 
10. France (39) 13. Holland (12) 
11. Belgium (34) 14. Ausria(4) 
12. Germany (30) 
The index of the number of strikers (measured by the yearly average 
number of strikes per 1000 employees) shows little differentiation in (see table 
A) as follows: 
1. Spain (204.2 Strikers) 
2. Greece (195.3) 
3. Italy (183.2) 
4. Finland (92.4) 
5. Portugal (36.8) 
6. Denmark (36.8) 
7. Ireland (33.3) 
8. United Kingdom (24.9) 
9. Sweden (11.1) 
10. Germany (7.7) 
11. France (6.1) 
12. Belgium (4.9) 
13. Holland (3.9) 
14. Austria (5.1) 
Countries standing higher in list of the number of strikers index, in 
comparison to their relative position in the index of the days lost are: Italy, 
Denmark, Portugal and Germany. The opposite has been recorded in the case 
of Finland, Ireland, United Kingdom, Sweden, France and Belgium. For the 
fourteen counties researched, the average ratio of the same index is 58.6 strikers 
per 1,000 employees per year. 
Also according to table A and diagram 6, countries with a long duration 
of strikes, (as measured by the index of the yearly average duration of strikes), 48 
successively are: 
1. United Kingdom (7.9 days) 4. France (6.5) 
2. Sweden (7.2) 5. Ireland (6.2) 
3. Belgium (6.9) 
Of medium duration and close to the European average of (2.2) days lost 
per year, are successively: 
6. Denmark (3.3) 8. Finland (2.9) 
7. Holland (3.0) 9. Spain (2.0) 
The limited duration strike action index includes: 
10. Greece (1.5) 12.Italy (1.2) 
11. Portugal (1.3) 13. Austria (0.8) 
It is evident from the above analysis that, there is quite a different pattern 
of industrial disputes among European countries, if one compares the yearly 
average days lost and the number of strikes index to the "yearly average 
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duration of strikes". Countries such as Spain, Greece and Italy, although in the 
top of the list in the case of days lost and the number of strikes, are characterized 
by medium or limited duration of twin strikes, and thus close to the European 
average of 2.2 days lost per year (see table A). 
On the other hand, countries which show a long duration of strikes, such 
as United Kingdom, Sweden and Belgium, are included in the list of medium-
prone strike states. 
In particular it should be noted that, at present Spain appears to the most 
turbulent industrial relations system, at least for the period researched, followed 
by Greece, Finland, Italy and Ireland. On the other hand, in Austria, and the 
Netherlands, strikes are almost non-existent there. 
Diagram 4 shows the evolution of the yearly days lost due to strike activity 
per 1000 employees between 1983-1993 for each country researched, as compared 
with the respective European average. It is evident from the same diagram 
that, there are strong periodic fluctuations of the yearly days lost in certain 
countries, between 1983 and 1993, notably in Finland, Spain, United Kingdom, 
Greece and Denmark. The opposite is noted for Austria, Netherlands, France 
Germany and Portugal. 
In general, there has been a reduction of strike activity, particularly during 
the 1990's - This fact should be attributed primarily to be the persistant increase 
of unemployment. This trend becomes evident if one studies the evolution of 
the most representatine index on strike action, that is the yearly average days 
lost per 1000 employees (see diagram 4). 
Nevertheless, although the number of days lost to industrial action is 
diminishing, the average number of strikes in the fourteen European Countries 
researched is not changing significantly. The same is also true for the average 
European Union duration of strikes index. 
Diagram 5 demonstates the structure of strikes (as measured by the yearly 
average of days lost), among the fourteen countries and the period researched, 
divided into the following two main categories: 
(a) Primary and secondary sector (agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing, 
mining, quarring, manufacturing, construction). 
(b) Tertiary sector (electricity, gas, water, trade, restaurants and hotels, 
transport, storage, communication, finacing, insurance, real estate, business 
service, community, social and personal services). 
Although there might be some considerable statistical errors due to 
differentiation in data sources and definitions, it is generally found that, 
countries in which strike activity concentrates on the primary and mainly the 
secondary sector (above the average of 50%), are successively the following: 
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1. Germany (81%) O. Italy (011lf1l) 
2. Denmark (78%) 7. Spain (01 Wo) 
3. France (76%) 8. Netherlands (58%) 
4. United Kingdon (73%) 9. Portugal (54%) 
5. Belgium (66%) 
Strike activity concentrated in the tertiary sector (above the average of 
50%), in the case of 
1. Austria (71 %) 
2. Sweden (70%) 
3. Greece (65%) 
4. Ireland (62%) 
5. Finland (54%) 
In the latter countries as other studies have concluded there emerges a so-
called "tertiarization of conflict": the theme here is that the service sector and 
in particular public services have become the cockpit of conflict, at a time 
when strike activity in manufacturing is diminishing. 49 
Differences in employment structure and in unemployment trends as well 
as other non-economic variables noted above, partly explain such diverse 
patterns of strike structure among the European countries reserached. 
MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
As indicated by several studies analyzed in this paper, unemployment seems 
to have generally a negative influence on the outcome of industrial conflict. 
This argument was found to be largely true in the analysis of unemployment 
and strike data of eleven European Union countries for the period of 
1983-1993. The negative correlation between unemployment and strikes, 
appears to be stronger in countries such as Greece, Ireland, Denmark, 
Netherlands and Italy, to be rather nebulous in Germany, France, Portugal 
and United Kingdom; and almost non existent in Spain and Belgium. 
(although in Spain there is an overall strong tendency to strike). 
This different pattern of strike action among the various countries, should 
be attributed to the influence of other non-economic variables such as: 
1. the year of natural elections; 
2. income and tax policies; 
3. inflation projections profit rises and wage structual changes; 
4. unionization density and strength; 
5. the degree of collective bargening centralisation structures and 
procedures; and 
6. political climate traditions and government attitude 
The above variables are drawn from extensive examination of the 
international bibliography on the subject as well as from testing the case of 
Greece for which first hand information exists. Furthermore, several findings 
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are also derived from the analysis of strike trends in fourteen European 
countries researched and then compared to the European average. Spain 
appears to be the champion in industrial disputes, followed by Greece, 
Finland, Italy and Ireland. On the other hand, Austria, followed by 
Netherlands is characterized by the most peaceful industrial relations system. 
The above findings are based on the examination of the index:')-early 
average days lost per 1000 employees" and the "yearly average number of 
strikers". Yet, there emerges quite different pattern of disputes among the 
countries researched if one compares the above index to the "yearly average 
duration of strikes". Countries such as Spain, Greece and Italy, show a most 
turbulent industrial relations situation. However they are characterized by the 
short duration of strikes, which are close to the European average of 2.2 days 
per year. On the other hand, countries with a long duration od strikes, such 
as the United Kingdom, Sweden and Belgium, appear to belong to the 
medium prone strike action countries. It was noted also, that in recent years, 
strike activity in some countries, such as Austria, Sweden, Greece, Spain and 
Ireland, have been concentrated in the tertiary sector, a phenomen which has 
been called the "tertiarization of conflict". 
More specifically, the course of unemployment in Greece, seems to have 
had a negative influence on the intensity of strike action. The data shows that 
when unemployment rises, strike action drops, and vice versa. In this repect 
the Greek record seems to support the conclusions searched by various 
research and studies carried out internationally. It is also confirmed by the 
record of other countries for the same period of 1983-1993. It is shown that the 
negative relationship between strikes and unemployment applies not only to 
Greece, but also to other countries, although there are some variations in 
intensity attributed to non-economic factors. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in terms of the countries in the 
European Union, the average for the period of 1983-93 indicates a clear 
negative relationship between unemployment and strike activity, which in 
effect, supports the general hypothesis of this study and its findings. 
13 
.
.
-
.
j>
. 
A
pp
en
di
x 
I 
St
ri
ke
 S
ta
ti
st
i 
C
ou
nt
rie
s 
SP
A
IN
 
G
R
E
E
C
E
l •3
 
FI
N
LA
N
D
 
IT
A
LY
2.
3 
IR
E
L
A
N
D
2 •
3 
U
N
. 
K
IN
G
D
O
M
 
D
E
N
M
A
R
K
3 
SW
E
D
E
N
 
PO
R
TU
G
A
L 
FR
A
N
C
E 
B
EL
G
IU
M
3 .4
 
G
ER
M
A
N
Y
s 
N
ET
H
ER
LA
N
D
S3
 
A
U
ST
R
IA
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
 
in
 f
ou
rt
 
Y
ea
rly
 a
v
e
ra
ge
 
e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
le
ve
l (
in 
'00
0) 
11
.7
05
,7
00
 
3.
63
8,
85
0 
2.
38
8,
70
0 
21
.2
36
,9
00
 
1.
10
3,
06
0 
25
.5
56
,4
00
 
2.
63
3,
48
0 
4.
28
6,
50
0 
4.
49
6,
27
0 
21
.9
26
,3
70
 
3.
66
9,
03
0 
28
.1
57
,1
00
 
5.
88
0,
90
0 
3.
37
6,
65
0 
14
0.
05
5,
91
0 
E 
c 
Y
ea
rl
y 
a
v
e
ra
ge
 
da
ys
 l
os
t 
pe
r 
c
o
u
n
tr
y 
(in
 '0
00
) 
4.
83
2,
48
0 
1.
07
3,
81
9 
64
9,
05
2 
4.
60
4,
27
8 
22
9,
71
7 
5,
06
7,
60
0 
31
8,
84
0 
34
5,
00
6 
21
3,
55
0 
87
4,
08
0 
12
3,
20
5 
85
1,
11
3 
68
,1
61
 
13
,8
01
 
18
.7
19
,6
99
 
i 
19
83
 -
9
3
 
-
-
Y
ea
rl
y 
a
v
e
ra
ge
 
Y
ea
rly
 a
v
e
ra
ge
 
Y
ea
rly
 a
v
e
ra
ge
 
Y
ea
rl
y 
a
v
e
ra
ge
 
n
u
m
be
r o
f s
tr
ik
er
s 
du
ra
tio
n 
o
f 
da
ys
 
da
ys
 lo
st
 p
er
 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f 
pe
r 
th
ou
sa
nd
 
lo
st
 d
ue
 to
 s
tr
ik
es
 
th
ou
sa
nd
 
e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
st
ri
ke
rs
 (i
n 
'00
0) 
e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
(d
ur
ati
on
 o
f 
(in
 '0
00
) 
st
rik
es
) 1
98
3 -
93
 
41
2,
83
1 
2.
39
0,
27
0 
20
4,
19
7 
2,
0 
29
5,
09
8 
71
0,
74
4 
19
5.
32
1 
1,
5 
27
1,
71
8 
22
0,
70
2 
92
,3
94
 
2,
9 
21
6,
80
6 
3.
88
9,
65
0 
18
3,
15
5 
1,
2 
20
8.
25
4 
36
,8
24
 
33
,3
83
 
6,
2 
19
8,
29
1 
63
8,
78
0 
24
,9
95
 
7,
9 
12
1,
07
2 
96
,9
43
 
36
,8
12
 
3,
3 
80
,4
87
 
47
,7
23
 
11
,1
33
 
7,
2 
47
,4
95
 
16
5,
64
0 
36
,8
39
 
1.3
 
39
,8
64
 
13
4,
35
0 
6,
12
7 
6,
5 
33
,5
80
 
17
,8
41
 
4,
86
3 
6,
9 
30
,2
27
 
21
5,
96
2 
7,
67
0 
-
11
,5
90
 
22
,9
02
 
3,
89
4 
3,
0 
4,
08
7 
17
,2
83
 
5,
11
8 
0,
8 
13
3,
65
9 
8.
20
4,
04
5 
58
,5
77
 
2,
2 
So
ur
ce
: O
w
n 
e
la
bo
ra
tio
n 
o
f d
at
a 
fr
om
 th
e 
IL
O
, "
Y
ea
rb
oo
k 
o
f L
ab
ou
r S
ta
tis
tic
s 
19
94
".
 S
ee
 al
so
 A
pp
en
di
x 
fo
r a
n
 a
n
a
ly
si
s o
f t
he
 m
e
th
od
og
ly
 u
se
d.
 
1 
St
ri
ke
 d
at
a 
fo
r 
G
re
ec
e 
de
riv
ed
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 G
en
er
al
 C
on
fe
de
ra
tio
n 
o
f G
re
ek
 L
ab
ou
r 
fo
r 
re
a
so
n
 e
x
pl
ai
ne
d 
in
 t
he
 A
pp
en
di
x.
 
2 
A
ve
ra
ge
 s
tr
ik
e 
da
ta
 f
or
 I
re
la
nd
 a
n
d 
Ita
ly
 d
oe
s 
n
o
t 
in
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
ye
ar
 1
99
3.
 
3 
Fo
r 
so
m
e
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
(D
en
ma
rk
 19
93
, G
re
ec
e 
19
83
, B
el
gi
um
 1
99
3,
 I
re
la
nd
 1
99
3,
 I
ta
ly
 1
99
3 
a
n
d 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 1
99
2) 
da
ta
 fo
r 
u
n
e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t w
a
s 
n
o
t 
a
v
a
ila
bl
e 
in
 th
e 
IL
O
 Y
ea
rb
oo
k 
o
f L
ab
ou
r S
ta
tis
tic
s 
19
94
 a
n
d 
it 
w
a
s 
a
ss
u
m
e
d 
th
at
 f
or
 th
os
e 
ye
ar
s 
it 
re
a
c
he
d 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r's
 le
ve
l. 
T
he
 
u
se
 o
f o
th
er
 m
a
in
 so
u
rc
e
 th
an
 th
e 
IL
O
 e
x
c
e
pt
 fo
r c
e
rt
ai
n 
ca
se
s,
 w
a
s 
a
v
o
id
ed
 fo
r r
e
a
so
n
s 
o
f s
ta
tis
tic
al
 c
o
m
pa
tib
ili
ty
 a
s 
e
x
pl
ai
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
A
pp
en
di
x.
 
4 
A
ve
ra
ge
 s
tr
ik
e 
da
ta
 f
or
 B
el
gi
um
 r
e
fe
rs
 o
n
ly
 t
o 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 1
98
8·
19
92
 f
or
 w
hi
ch
 s
ta
tis
tic
al
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
fro
m
 I
LO
 w
a
s 
av
ai
la
bl
e.
 
5 
D
at
a 
is 
n
o
t 
a
v
a
ila
bl
e 
in
 t
he
 I
LO
 Y
ea
rb
oo
k 
19
94
 f
or
 t
he
 n
u
m
be
r 
o
f s
tr
ik
es
 in
 G
er
m
an
y 
a
n
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
th
e 
a
v
e
ra
ge
 d
ur
at
io
n 
o
f s
tr
ik
es
 c
a
n
n
o
t 
be
 c
al
cu
la
te
d.
 
Appendix 11 
A NOTE ON THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
As previously mentioned, the main source of data for this study was derived 
from the LL.O.'s "Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1994". The original source of 
the same data is mainly drawn by the ILO from the government statistical 
services of the countries included in the study. For reasons of statistcal 
comparability, the use of sources than other those of the ILO except for certain 
cases, was avoided. 
Our estimates where also checked and compared with Eurostat statistics 
and publications and especially the "Rapid Reports","Populations and Social 
Conditions", and "The Trends in Industrial Disputes in the European &onomic 
Area, 1983-1992". There exists certain differences in statistical data between 
the two main sources, that is "The Yearbook of Labour Statistics of the ILO 
and the Eurostat of the EC", although the general trends and fmdings are rather 
similar. 
It should also be noted here that we attempted to extend our conlusions 
on data based on a long period of time, that is between 1973 and 1993 but there 
were many statistical differences and information gaps so that we avoided the 
issue. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the deficiency in data found, it 
appears that the negative correlation between unemployment and strike trends 
for the extended period of the twenty years between 1973-1993, in the sense 
that, there is very general lowering of strike activity which could be attributed, 
to a certain degree, to the persistent increase in unemployment. 
The extensive and methodological elaboration of statistical data was made 
in cooperation with my collaborator economist Stefanos Karakitsos, while the 
data was collected by the young economist Georgia Tsetsou. Many thanks are 
due to Professor Chris Jeckins for his important observations and contributions 
to this study. 
For Belgium and Netherlands, there is an incomplete time series, while 
for Luxembourg it is not available at all. The data used for Greece derived 
from data published by the "General Confederation of Labour of Greece", which 
develops its information from data reported by the "Greek National Statistical 
Service". Although the Confederation may have over-estimated some of its strike 
data, its chronological series and sectoral analysis are usually daily complete, 
and satisfactory. 
Strike data refers to strikes of employees as well as to the lock-outs of 
employees because in most counties they are calculated together. Any deviation 
from these calculations is explained in a related footnote in the ILO Yearbook 
Labour Statistics initial and analytical data. 
The mandays lost because of strikes therefore refers to the total number 
of days lost per year because of a strike or a lock-out that effect and involve 
all employees directly and/or indirectly. In some cases, workers who have been 
15 
involved indirectly in a work stoppage, are not included in the offical statistics. 
Certain countries do not report strikes os a minimum magnitude in their 
statistics. 
A special mathematical method has been used to compare developments 
in the index of unemployment and stikes. The two indices used, were calculated 
in a way which facilitates comparison. 
The comparison of the evolution of the unemployment rate and days lost 
due to work stoppage indices, was elaborated after specific mathematical data 
conversation. The fact that those indices are based on different units 
(percentages and thousands of days), imposed their conversion to a unique 
counting scale in order to make possible their illustration on the same axis as 
follows: 
X'i = [(Xi - minX)/(maxX - minX)] * 100 
X'i=New score 
Xi = Original score 
minX=Minimum score of variable X 
maxX = Maximum score of variable X 
For instance, in the United Kingdom, the following procedure has been 
adopted. 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
min 
max 
Original Rates 
% unem/nt 
12,9% 
11,6% 
11,8% 
11,8% 
10,6% 
8,4% 
6,3% 
5,9% 
8,1% 
9,9% 
10,4% 
5,9% 
12,9% 
Lost Days 
(u€ '000) 
3.754 
27.134 
6.402 
1.920 
3.547 
3.706 
4.127 
1,901 
761 
528 
650 ........ 
528 
27.134 
Conversed Rates 
unem/ment Index of working 
index days lost 
100 12,12 
81,42 100 
84,28 22,07 
84,28 5,23 
67,14 11,34 
35,71 11,94 
5,71 13,52 
0 5,16 
31,42 0,87 
57,14 0 
64,28 Q,~~-
.-
(maximum unemployment-minimum unemployment) = 7% 
(maximum lost days-minimum lost days) = 26.606 
16 
Thus for unemployment in 1993 we have: X'i= [(Xi-minX)/(maxX-minX)] *100 
= [(10,4% - 5,9%)/(12,9% - 5,9%)] *100 = (4,5% /7%)*100 = 64,28 and so forth. 
The difference between every rate minus the minimum rate of the variable 
is expressed as a percentage of the variable range. This procedure is useful 
only for grasping the meaning of proportional up-down swing of these two 
indices and not for estimating the evolution of their sbsolute changes. 
Furthermore, such a transformation is not necessary for comparisons among 
different countries, because in this case rate's conversion is not required. 
For the correlation between unemployment and strikes as presented in 
diagrams here, see notes in diagram 1. Also see other notes in table A and 
diagrams for particular explanations of methodology used. 
The absence or the partial presentation of certain countries in the diagrams, 
is due to the lack of completed time series for unemployment and/or strikes. 
The index of the "yearly average of strike activity days per 100 employees" 
was derived from dividing the number of days lost (in each one country covered 
by the study) by the total number of those employed in the same year. For 
certain countries where no related employment data was available, it was 
hypothesized that, the rates of employment remained about the same or that 
even if there were some minor differences, they were not of such magnitude 
which could affect significally the overall statistical presentation. 
The rates concerning the index for the European Union total were 
calculated on the basis of the data provided by the member-States. Therefore, 
the index presented does not in this case give the exact average for the European 
Union, but an approximate one. For instance, Italy and Spain are not included 
for the year 1992, Belgium in not included for the years 1984-87 and 
Luxembourg, is not included in any repeated year because, as already 
mentioned, data simply does not exist at all in these cases. 
The index for the yearly average number of strikes per 1000 employees, 
derived from dividing ( in every country covered by the study) the employed 
of the same year by the total numbers of strikes per year. The same arguments 
mentioned above also apply in this case. 
The index of the yearly duration of days lost due to strike action derived 
from the following mathematical model: 
AlC X 
= Z 
B/C Y 
A = Number of days lost as result of strikes 
B = Numbers of Strikers 
C = Numbers of Strikes 
X= Average Total of strike duration 
Y = Average participation per strike 
Z=Average duration of strikes 
17 
Country indices concerning calculations for the above model are subject 
to the same minor inefficiencies of the available data as mentioned previously. 
The structure of strikes has been shown for a) The primary and secondary 
sector, and b) the tertiary sector. Estimates for each country in the study, concern 
the particular sector of the economy and the average days lost in the 1983-93 
decade. The figures made for diagram 7 were based on those averages. For 
certain counties as for example Belgium, these averages include only the years 
for which data was available (1988-1992) 
For Greece and Spain, there were a considerable number of strikes which 
were reported without specifying the particular sector in which they occured. 
Therefore, they were considered as strikes of all sectors and were allotted to 
the percentages established by the different sectors. 
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